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Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union 
2.1.1  Introduction 
Net capital flows to eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union built up 
rapidly during the 1980s, reaching around US$5 billion per annum in the sec- 
ond half of the decade. This was largely in the form of commercial bank loans 
and trade finance to state-owned foreign trade banks subject to sovereign guar- 
antees. The dramatic changes of the early transition period saw a large rise in 
the share of Western official lending, while private capital was initially hesi- 
tant. Most of the old loans have, indeed, been subject to default. Now, seven or 
eight years into the transition, capital flows have increased sharply and new 
flows are predominantly to (and from) private entities. 
The Berlin Wall fell in the autumn of  1989 and the countries of central Eu- 
rope embarked very quickly on programs of liberalization, privatization, and 
institutional change. Serious attempts at market reform did not take place in 
the former Soviet Union until after its breakup in the autumn of  1991. Capital 
flows started to pick up with a two- or three-year delay and were directed to 
The authors are grateful for the assistance of Avyi Sarris. Kasper Bartholdy, Steven Fries, Joel 
Hellman, and Ricardo Lago provided helpful comments. 
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those countries that were clearly more successful in their market reforms and 
at macroeconomic stabilization.' Flows to the western parts of the former com- 
munist region, indeed to the region itself, have been dominated by those to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. However, in the past year or two, capital 
flows to Russia have picked up sharply. For 1997 it is likely that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the region will be around US$15 to $18 billion, with other 
net private flows around twice that level. 
The buildup of FDI has been fairly steady as investor confidence has grown 
and prospects have  become clearer. There have, however, been very  strong 
surges coinciding with major privatizations of infrastructure, for example, in 
Hungary in 1995.  The most recent surge in FDI has been in Poland and Russia. 
The movement of portfolio investments into the region as a whole has been 
rather less steady, with very strong acceleration in the past one to two years, as 
the perception of risk has adjusted sharply. 
In this paper, we examine some of the determinants and consequences of 
capital flows to the region. We conclude that FDI is driven primarily by prog- 
ress in transition and macroeconomic stability. It is these factors that allow the 
huge potential of the region to be unlocked. That potential is itself based on 
strong endowments of human capital and natural resources together with ad- 
vantageous geographical position. FDI was initially oriented to establishing 
positions in domestic markets, but as reforms advance, countries attract more 
FDI and the type of FDI they attract is more integrated into international pro- 
duction networks. Because portfolio flows have grown only very recently, there 
is less firm analysis of their determinants. They would, no doubt, be influenced 
by underlying factors similar to those affecting FDI. However, in the case of 
FDI commitments have responded gradually to the changing circumstances, 
whereas the recent past has seen some very dramatic changes in perceptions 
driving portfolio flows. Indeed, movements in the underlying process appear 
steadier than those in perceptions. It therefore seems unlikely that the recent 
acceleration in portfolio investment will be maintained, as the adjustment in 
perceived risk and the rearrangement of portfolios it entailed should probably 
be seen as a one-off event. 
The impact of capital flows to the region is of  fundamental importance to 
the economic transition. These flows bring new methods of business organi- 
zation, new technologies, and powerful influences on the building of financial, 
regulatory, and other institutions. They help establish the financial discipline 
that is crucial to the effective functioning of  a market economy. Thus their 
impact goes far beyond the simple availability of  resources. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2.1.2 we 
1. They were, however, slowed in countries such as Poland, where there were womes about 
earlier problems of large indebtedness (Poland's gross external debt was almost 80 percent of GDP 
in 1990). This did not apply to the Czech Republic, where inherited debts were small, or to Hun- 
gary, where the perceived probability of default was low (and indeed Hungary has been the only 
country with heavy debts that has not defaulted). 59  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
describe  capital flows as they have developed over the past two decades. In sec- 
tion 2.1.3 we look more closely at some of the patterns involved and consider 
the key determinants of FDI, commercial bank lending, and portfolio flows. In 
section 2.1.4 we comment briefly on some consequences for the host econo- 
mies, and in section 2.1.5 we consider prospects and policy questions facing 
host governments and international financial institutions. Table 2.1 provides 
summary statistics on the twenty-six countries of the region, which has a popu- 
lation of 400 million people and a combined GDP of around US$l,OOO billion. 
2.1.2  Capital Flows before and after 1989 
Pretransition Period 
The central planners were no strangers to international capital markets. 
Since the late 1970s, various governments developed active borrowing pro- 
grams. These may be seen as part of efforts to sustain consumption in the face 
of ever-increasing investment targets as the productivity of capital continued 
its decades-long decline. The USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and later 
Bulgaria approached the syndicated loan market, generally through their for- 
eign trade banks, and expanded the use of export credit and short-term trade 
finance.*  East Germany relied more on its ability to extract bilateral credits 
from the Federal Republic. Equity finance was foreign to socialism, and the 
decentralized nature of  bond finance was not in favor with the powers that 
were. The sovereign risk of these economies was well regarded, as evidenced 
by their ability to raise rapidly their levels of indebtedness, although Yugosla- 
via and Poland underwent a series of  debt restructurings as early as the late 
1970s and early 1980s, respectively. Net medium- to long-term capital flows 
to the region averaged US$1.2 billion per year in 1976-80,  $1.8 billion in 
1981-85,  and $5 billion in 1986-90 (table 2.2). The USSR continued to have 
access to large-scale commercial bank lending until its breakup in 1991. Ex- 
cept for Czechoslovakia and Romania, these countries entered the transition 
process with heavy debt burdens on which-apart  from Hungary-they  even- 
tually defa~lted.~ 
Economic Performance and Risk 
The transition process changed radically both the volume and the compo- 
sition of external capital flows. Capital flows from 1989 to 1993 were shaped 
by  the determination of Western governments to support and protect the pro- 
found political and economic changes that were taking place. Private sources 
of funds, however, understandably took a wait-and-see approach. Country and 
2. Foifeifing-a  way of securitizing trade credit-developed  into an art in Comecon trade fi- 
3. The problem of East German debt "resolved" itself with unification. 
nance, perhaps more so than in any other part of the world. Table 2.1  Economic and Structural Indicators in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
External  Preferred  Average 
Population,  Real GDP,  Consumer Prices  FDI  (net),  Debt,  Creditor  Country Risk  Transition 
1996  1997 Projection”  (year-end),  1996 Estimate  1996  Debt, 1996  as of  Indicator 
Estimate  1997 Projection  Estimate  Estimate  September 1997 
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Nore: Data for 1990-96 represent the most recent official estimates of outturns as reflected in publications  from the national authorities,  the IMF,  the World Bank, the OECD, PlanExon, and the 
Institute of International  Finance. Data for 1996 are preliminary actuals, mostly official government estimates. Data for 1997 represent EBRD projections. 
“Based on official estimates. Unofficial economic activity has been estimated to account for between 20 percent (eastern Europe) and 45 percent (CIS) of  “hue GDP,” and relative prices have 
changed radically between 1989 and 1997. These indexes should therefore be interpreted with caution, with relative values across countries probably more reliable than levels. 
bPopnlation  data include refugees abroad (approximately  one-third of the total). Inflation figure refers to annual average. Table 2.2  Net Capital Flows to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Totalflows 
Private  flows 
Equity investment 
Direct equity investment 
Portfolio equity investment 
Commercial banks 
Other private creditors 
Official  flows 
International  financial institutions 
Official bilateral creditors 
Annual Average 

































































































































Sources: Institute of International  Finance, except direct equity investment from EBRD; portfolio equity calculated as residual. 
Note: Data cover Bulgaria,  the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic. 62  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
commercial risk was, and was perceived to be, extremely high. The extreme 
dislocation meant that the macroeconomic position was very weak. When eco- 
nomic performance improved and the transition progressed, private capital be- 
gan to enter the market, first timidly, then with great speed. Before discussing 
the evidence on capital flows it is important to have a picture of the economic 
circumstances in the early transition years. These varied substantially across 
countries with strong implications for risk and performance. 
In the early years of transition, beginning around 1989-90 in eastern Europe 
and 1992 in the former Soviet Union,4  central economic coordination (such as 
it was) was lost, with markets only gradually taking its place. Macroeconomic 
conditions were highly unsettled, relative prices adjusted sharply, and political 
uncertainty was severe, particularly in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Output contracted until  1993-94  in eastern Europe and the Baltics and until 
1997 in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),5  for cumulative de- 
clines of 20 and 44 percent, respectively.6  In 1992, only six economies in the 
region, out of twenty-six, recorded inflation of less than 100 percent. Macro- 
economic conditions, in terms of inflation, improved rapidly in eastern Europe 
after 1993, and in the CIS from about 1995. In  1997 economic growth is re- 
turning to the region as a whole. Only seven countries are experiencing eco- 
nomic decline-largely  those where structural reforms have been lagging- 
and eleven are experiencing GDP growth in excess of 4 percent. In only three 
countries is inflation expected to be at triple-digit levels in 1997. The turn- 
around in growth is primarily due to the end of economic contraction in Russia, 
the region’s largest economy, which is expected to show small but positive 
growth this year. Performance has not improved consistently across the region. 
Some major setbacks, for example, recently in Albania, Bulgaria, and Roma- 
nia, demonstrate the fragile nature of the recovery. Nevertheless, with a com- 
bined GDP of  around US$l,OOO billion-one-sixth  of aggregate developing 
country GDP, or 3 percent of the world economy-the  region is rapidly estab- 
lishing itself as a major “emerging” market.’ 
After  some degree of  uniformity  in the  very early transition,  individual 
4. The initiation of price and trade liberalization is taken here as indicating the “starting point” 
of the transition. 
5. Eastern Europe includes the twenty-six countries in table 2.1 less those of the former Soviet 
Union. The CIS includes the former Soviet Union less the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania). 
6.  This calculation is based on official statistics and covers the period of contraction (1989-93 
in eastern Europe and the Baltics and 1989-97 in the CIS). There are, of course, serious measure- 
ment issues in terms of earlier rationing, quality change, changes in reporting incentives, changes 
in official procedures, etc. Informal, mostly private, economic activity was estimated to account 
for about 20 percent of actual GDP in eastern Europe and more than 40 percent in the CIS (exclud- 
ing central Asia) in  1995 and is only partly reflected in adjustments to official GDP data; see 
EBRD (1997, chap. 4). 
7. It has around 7 percent of the world‘s population, and thus GDP per capita a little under half 
the world average. The countries are all middle income according to the World Rank classification, 
except for Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Tajikis- 
tan, which are low income (less than US$755 per capita in 1995). 63  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
countries quickly began to differ across the various dimensions of reform. So 
too did risk perceptions. Most countries moved rapidly to liberalize prices and 
markets. Progress on privatization was more uneven, but it is now fairly ad- 
vanced in a majority of countries. In much of the region governments are now 
engaged in a “second phase” of direct sales of banks, infrastructure, and “stra- 
tegic” companies, after an emphasis on speed in the “mass privatizations” of 
the first phase. A few transition economies now have private sector shares in 
GDP that are similar to many developed market economies. The greatest dif- 
ferences among countries are in the more qualitative aspects of transition, the 
building of  sound financial and other market-supporting institutions, and the 
restructuring and governance of enterprises. Central European reformers are 
making some progress on these dimensions. But they still have far to go, and 
further east and south progress remains limited. 
Investment and lending risk are closely associated with progress in transi- 
tion. Figure 2.1 displays the results of a European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) survey among actual and potential investors in the re- 
gion, conducted in 1995 (for details, see appendix B). Note that, among five 
sources of risk presented to investors in the survey, regulatory and macroeco- 
nomic risks were judged to be most significant (by far) whatever the perceived 
risk level. It is evident from the figure that there is a close (negative) associa- 
tion between progress in transition and perceived country risk: there is a rank 
correlation coefficient of  -.89  for the host countries included in the survey 
(see also table 2.1 for recent credit ratings). 
Capital Flows and the Transition 
Reflecting Western official support for the transition as well as the develop- 
ments discussed above, capital flows to the region have  followed a distinct 
sequence, with official funding, FDI, commercial lending not guaranteed in 
the countries of origin, dedicated equity funds, and finally direct local stock 
and money market investments entering successively at one- to two-year inter- 
vals (table 2.2 and figs. 2.2 and 2.3).8  In important respects this may be seen 
as a “telescoped” version of the recent history of capital flows elsewhere, com- 
pressed into a much shorter period of time. It must be kept in mind, however, 
that there are serious data problems with measures of capital flows in the transi- 
tion economies. Commercial bank syndicated lending and bond issues tend 
to be reasonably well covered by  the Euromoney databases (Bondware and 
Loanware), but measures of  FDI  and, in particular, of  portfolio equity and 
money market investments can differ enormously. For aggregate flows we rely 
here on information on a subset of countries compiled by the Institute of Inter- 
national Finance, but we supplement this with FDI estimates prepared from 
8. Note that this sequence refers to increases in net exposure; gross flows of bank lending not 
guaranteed  in  the  country of  origin,  largely  to refinance existing  official debt,  were  present 
throughout the early transition phase. 0  5  10  15 
Average risk ranking 
20  25 
Fig. 2.1  EBRD transition indicators (1995) versus perceived country risk 
Note: Countries are ranked by perceived country risk (horizontal axis)  and level of transition (vertical axis). Interviewees were 
asked to assign the countries that they felt confident assessing to one of four risk groups ranging from 1 (low risk, comparable 
to risk in OECD countries) to 4  (unacceptably high risk). The data reported here represent the average of  ratings. The measure 
of progress in transition is taken from the EBRD’s annual Transition Report, with 1995 results used here for consistency with 
the risk assessments. The rankings are based on simple averages of scores-ranging  from  1 (little progress) to 4  (advanced 
transition)-on  the EBRD’s eight transition indicators for 1995: extent of privatization (two indicators), extent of enterprise 
restructuring, scope and openness of markets (two indicators), progress in financial sector reform (two indicators), and progress 
in the creation of legal and institutional frameworks supporting private sector activity. 65  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
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Fig. 2.2  Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union: net private and official 
capital flows, 1989-97  (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: Institute of International  Finance. 
Note: Data cover Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak 
Republic. The figure for 1997 is a projection. 
balances of payments (mostly drawn from the International Monetary Fund- 
IMF) and EBRD information on equity funds. 
Beginning in 1989-90, official funding, and funding guaranteed by Western 
export credit agencies (ECAs), increased sharply, while private sources of funds 
were largely absent from the region. A large share of the official capital flows 
were on account of German transfers to the former Soviet Union as part of the 
German unification agreement (e.g., housing for repatriated USSR soldiers), 
but substantial official support was forthcoming from a range of bilateral and 
multilateral sources (e.g., international  financial institution contributions  to the 
stabilization fund for Poland in 1991).9  Net official flows to the seven largest 
recipient countries covered by  table 2.2  peaked in  1991 at US$21 billion.I0 
After 1993, they declined both as a share of the total and in absolute terms. 
Private flows to these countries began to exceed net official flows in 1993 and 
9. In addition, Paris Club reschedulings were granted to Poland (1991, concessional terms), 
10. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak Republic. 
Bulgaria (1991, 1992,1994). and Russia (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996). 
Data from the Institute of International  Finance. 66  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
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Fig. 2.3  Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union: composition of private 
capital flows, 1989-97 
Source:  Institute of International Finance. 
Note: Data cover Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the Slovak 
Republic. The figure for 1997 is a projection. 
by  1996 accounted for $34 billion out of $41 billion in total net capital flows 
(excluding net resident lending abroad). This represented 14 percent of aggre- 
gate net private flows to developing countries." In 1997, net private flows are 
projected to rise to $52 billion, or more than 5 percent of  the GDP of  the 
region. After a relatively minor presence as a destination in earlier years, Rus- 
sia has,  since 1996 and especially in  1997, increasingly dominated private 
flows of all types and may at present account for more than half of all flows. 
While foreigners have invested in Russia, however, Russians have increasingly 
transferred funds abroad, an estimated total of $29 billion in 1996. The main 
channels have been the nonrepatriation of export proceeds (accounting for per- 
haps $18 billion) and currency purchases by the population (IMF 1997). 
The following provides a brief description of developments in different cate- 
gories of private capital flows. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The entry of private nonguaranteed capital was led by FDI (table 2.3). Hun- 
gary was the first country to receive significant FDI flows in  1991, mostly in 
the form of  acquisitions under the Hungarian privatization program, and to a 
lesser extent Czechoslovakia  (whose primary method  of  privatization  was 
through vouchers). Poland, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and some smaller coun- 
tries (Estonia and Slovenia) began to attract FDI over the period 1992-94.  In 
1995-96,  FDI flows surged and began to cover a broader range of  countries. 
In those two years (cumulatively), FDI in the transition economies accounted 
11. With the transition economies included in the total for developing countries Table 2.3  Foreign Direct Investment (inflows recorded in the balance of payments) 
Total (million US$)  Per Capita (US$) 
Cumulative FDI  Cumulative FDI  FDI Inflows as 
1996  Inflows,  Inflows,  FDI Inflows,  a Percentage 
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Sources; IMF, central banks, and EBRD estimates. 
"FDI figures for Lithuania are only available from 1993. For 1993 and 1994, figures cover only investment in equity capital. 68  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
for about 13 percent of  aggregate FDI outside the developed market econo- 
mies. In 1995, Hungary attracted the largest amount of FDI per capita of any 
country outside the developed market economies, and the share of FDI in its 
GDP exceeded 10 percent. Poland developed into the top destination in 1996 
(with FDI doubling two years in a row), and large privatizations with foreign 
participation in the telecommunications and oil sectors have strongly increased 
inflows to Russia in 1997. One-quarter of the region’s total FDI in 1997, which 
we expect to reach US$15 to $18 billion, is likely to flow to each of Poland 
and Russia. There is also concentration among countries of  origin. By 1996 
about one-third of cumulative FDI flows to eastern Europe had originated in 
Germany, while a similar proportion of the flows to the CIS is of U.S. origin 
(with hardly any German investment at all). 
Commercial Bank Lending and International Bond Finance 
By 1993, commercial bank lending and international bond issues began to 
pick up. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 provide a graphic representation of developments 
in these markets by subregion. After an initial “getting-to-know’’ period, these 
flows have surged in 1997. The share of the former Soviet Union in the total, 
large in 1990 and 1991 before the breakup of the USSR, remained relatively 
low from 1992 to 1996 but has been rising very strongly in 1997. Funding for 
the more advanced countries of eastern Europe grew at a more steady rate over 
the same period.’*  While sovereign and other public sector issuers have been 
particularly prominent on international bond markets-with  Russia, the cities 
of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Ukraine, Lithuania, Moldova, and Kazakhstan 
making debut public offerings since the beginning of  1997-significant  issues 
have also been made by “blue chip” commercial entities and banks, especially 
in the advanced countries of central Europe. Several Russian regional authori- 
ties, municipalities, and enterprises are expected to launch international bonds 
during the remainder of  1997. Since 1995, private borrowers have dominated 
the commercial loan market, the vast majority in the form of bank-to-bank 
loans and project financing. Again, borrowers from Russia have been particu- 
larly active on this market recently. Syndicated loans to twenty-one Russian 
banks for a total value of US$1.2 billion were registered in the first half of 
1997 alone, usually with maturities of one year or less. 
Along with rising volumes, terms have generally improved, but there are 
cases of rapid reversal that demonstrate the fragility of these markets and the 
information problem still faced by  investor^.'^ Issue spreads of 375, 325, 100, 
and 80 basis points over U.S. Treasury bills were recorded in 1997 bond issues 
by Russia (June, ten-year maturity), Ukraine (August, one year), Poland (June, 
twenty  years),  and  Croatia  (February, five years), respectively. As  of  mid- 
September, effective spreads were 312, 283,  120, and 152 basis points, sug- 
12. The “blip” in bond issues to eastern Europe in 1993 is due to the Bank of Hungary’s issuing 
13. Information on terms is drawn from the Euromoney Loanware and Bondware databases. 
twenty-one bonds to finance growing current account deficits. 25.000 
PlCzech Republic. Hungary Poland 
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Fig. 2.5  International bond issues by subregion (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: Euromoney Bondware. 
Note: “Other central and eastern Europe” includes the Baltics. 70  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
gesting improved confidence in the former two countries and slightly deterio- 
rating confidence in the latter two. Figure 2.6 describes the movement over 
time of  average maturities and spreads of  syndicated loans to public sector 
borrowers in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Russia.I4 It 
shows that spreads fell first in the Czech Republic in 1994-95, whereas a more 
generalized decline in spreads came only in 1996-97.15 It is interesting to note 
that Russian public sector borrowers continue to pay a far higher premium than 
the old Soviet Vneshekonombank used to be charged in 1990-91. 
Portfolio Equity 
Dedicated country and regional equity funds entered the region quite early, 
focusing primarily on central Europe, but their period of rapid expansion came 
in  1993-94 (table 2.4). As of September 1997, there were 170 portfolio funds 
(investing in listed securities) and 64 direct equity funds (unlisted shares), with 
cumulative investments of US$11 and $2.2  billion, respectively.’6  The vast ma- 
jority of  funds, including regional funds, have  been invested in Russia and 
Poland, with estimates of around one-half and one-fifth, respectively, of the to- 
tal. Closed-end funds were prevalent in the earlier stages of transition, but an 
increasing number are now open ended. While Western pension funds and other 
institutional investors account for much of  the capital of the portfolio funds, 
the capital of private individuals is more prominent in funds specializing in un- 
listed shares. 
Over recent years, eastern European and Russian corporates and banks have 
increasingly taken the direct route to overseas equity markets, although this 
group still represents a small share of aggregate flows. Issues have generally 
taken the form of ADRs/GDRs and private placements,” but there have also 
been direct listings on the London Stock Exchange. International equity issues, 
primarily in conjunction with privatization, were initially dominated by Hun- 
gary, which issued US$837 million in shares abroad over the period 1994-96. 
Poland had issues of $218 million in 1995, but it was in 1996 that this form of 
finance took off, with a total of $1.3 billion in share issues from seven coun- 
tries. Russia ($800 million) again dominated this segment.’*  Overseas issues 
are viewed increasingly as an attractive option by large companies in the region 
14. Fig. 2.6 only draws on those commercial bank loans for which pricing information is avail- 
15. Data refer to the first half of 1997. 
16. Disbursements as measured in the EBRD Database, Early Stage Equity team. 
17. American and Global Depository Receipts spare nonresident investors the settlement and 
custody problems of  what are still weak institutional infrastructures for capital markets in the 
region. 
18. The largest single issue in a transition economy was from Russia’s Gazprom (US$430 mil- 
lion ADR). Lukoil of  Russia plans to raise $1 billion in New York this year. In central Europe, 
MATAV,  the Hungarian telecommunications company, will likely be the largest issue so far, with 
a value of  perhaps $0.5 billion. 
























 Table 2.4  Equity Funds in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Commonwealth  of Independent States (millions of U.S. dollars) 
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because of the lack of depth and liquidity of domestic equity markets. Some 
fifteen Russian corporates had launched ADR programs by the spring of 1997, 
and at least as many others were preparing such issues. 
Money Market Investments 
Inflows to local markets for short-term securities (a similarly recent phenom- 
enon) have made an equally spectacular start and are again dominated by Rus- 
sia. Inflows to the Russian T-bill (GKO and OFZ) market have been prompted 
by the gradual relaxation  of  restrictions on purchases by  nonresidents  since 
early 1996, which has been partly motivated by the authorities’ desire to lower 
the cost of  public  debt.19 Nonresidents  purchased  US$5.6  billion  in T-bills 
through “S” accounts in 1996, and $5.4 billion in January-April  1997 alone. 
By April, they held approximately one-quarter of outstanding issues through 
these official channels, with additional stakes held as the result of “gray mar- 
ket” operations with Russian intermediaries. Since mid-1997, with yields on 
GKOs having declined significantly (from 89 percent annualized in early 1996 
to 28 percent in April 1997), foreigners have been entering the more “exotic” 
Russian regional and municipal bond markets in search of higher yields (e.g., 
Orenburg*O T-bills yielded 600 basis points over GKOs in August). Unhedged 
positions are now being taken in rubles. 
The experience of Ukraine and Bulgaria demonstrates the impact that for- 
eign inflows have had on market conditions (see figs. 2.7 and 2.8). In both 
countries, foreign investors were all but absent from the domestic securities 
markets until late 1996. Foreign hedge funds and proprietary traders of various 
investment banks began to enter the Ukrainian hryvna T-bill market in massive 
volumes in January 1997 and contributed to driving down yields by about 25 
percentage points (annualized) within a matter of two weeks and by a further 
10 percentage points by mid-July. In Bulgaria, annualized yields on four-week 
T-bills fell from 600 to 100 percent within the first three weeks of April after 
the government signed an IMF program, They declined further to less than 6 
percent in July. Foreigners accounted for 20 percent (or US$98 million) of the 
outstanding stock of  T-bills at the end of August,  up from virtually  nil  in 
March. In addition, over the same period $225 million was invested in Bulgar- 
ian bank recapitalization bonds with a twenty-five-year maturity (indexed to 
the U.S. dollar but payable in leva), driving the market price up from around 
40 to 75 percent of nominal value. 
19. Since early 1996, nonresidents have been allowed to open so-called ruble “S” accounts at 
designated Russian banks to buy government paper, but profits have to be repatriated through 
contracts involving a cap on dollar yields. This requirement is gradually being phased out and 
markets are set to be fully liberalized by  early 1998. “Gray market” purchases involving Russian 
intermediaries  have  played  on  the  large  arbitrage  margins  between  resident  and  nonresident 
markets. 
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Fig. 2.7 
June 1997 
Source: Salmon  Brothers International. 
Note: Gaps indicate no data, holiday, or halt in trading. 
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Fig. 2.8  Bulgaria: annualized yield on four-week treasury bills, January to 
June 1997 (percent) 
Source: Salmon  Brothers International. 
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2.1.3  Capital Flows: Patterns and Determinants 
Private capital flows to the transition economies have a short history. The 
recent surge in net inflows means that, by the end of this year under current 
projections, almost two-thirds of all private capital will have entered the region 
during 1996 and 1997. Combined with the paucity of detailed data, this makes 
a formal analysis of the determinants-let  alone the consequences-of  these 
inflows difficult. As mentioned, FDI has a slightly longer history in the transi- 
tion economies than most other forms of capital flow, and we are able to draw 
on survey evidence and EBRD experience to discuss its motives and impact. 
As we shall see, FDI may also be a particularly important form of capital flow 
for the region because it goes well beyond the provision of finance in its ability 
to cement and promote the transition process. Our discussion of the patterns 
and determinants of portfolio flows will be shorter and will rely on more cir- 
cumstantial evidence. 
Our main result is that the level, location, and motive of FDI in the region 
are all closely associated with progress in transition. In other words, the basic 
human, natural resource, and geographical endowments are strong, implying 
that potential returns will be high if economic policies and institutions allow. 
While portfolio movements appear to be dominated by  shorter run develop- 
ments, these flows have essentially the same determinants and have recently 
“caught up” with reforms in the sense of  investors’ (rapidly) adjusting their 
perceptions of risks and returns. The markets have now recognized that gradual 
improvements in the structural and institutional fundamentals have gone a long 
way. Other factors, particularly macroeconomic stability, will have their role to 
play, but the progress in transition is and will be the driving force in integrating 
these economies into global markets. 
Location of Foreign Direct Investment 
As we have emphasized, Hungary and other eastern European destinations 
were the first to attract significant inflows of FDI. Russia and the oil economies 
of  the CIS followed with some delay.  Several countries of  central Asia, the 
Caucasus, and southeastern Europe have so far failed to prove attractive to in- 
vestors. The transition process first got under way in central Europe, and these 
economies continue to lead both in the depth of their reforms and in the volume 
of investment. It is tempting to compare measures of progress in transition with 
FDI per capita. Leaving out the three oil and gas economies of central Asia (Az- 
erbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), the rank correlation coefficient for 
twenty-two countries between the EBRD’s average transition indicator in 1996 
and cumulative FDI per capita over the period 1989-96  is .88 (it is .86 for FDI 
per capital in 1996 alone).*l This association supports the conclusion that it is 
21. See table 2.1 for the EBRD’s transition indicator. The measure used here is the average of 
scores, on a scale from 1  to 4,  along eight dimensions of  transition, including large and small 
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Table 2.5  Obstacles to Doing Business: Survey Results 
Developed 
Economies 
Developing  Market 
CIS  World  Countries 
High taxes or tax 
regulations  80  59  62  50 
Policy instability  52  32  36  12 
General uncertainty about 
costs of regulations  44  29  30  17 
Crime and theft  48  38  43  11 
Corruption  84  47  54  18 
Source: World Bank (1997b). 
Note: Table reports percentage of respondents reporting a “strong obstacle.” 
the reform process that opens opportunities for profitable investment and that, 
through its impact on risk (as discussed in section 2.1.2), motivates investors 
to take advantage of  them. It also suggests that direct equity investors have 
evaluated the economic environment and made informed choices.22 
Continued reforms can therefore be expected to elicit additional growth in 
investment. These reforms have far to go, especially in the CIS. Both the practi- 
cal experience of the EBRD and recent World Bank (1997b) survey evidence 
suggest that shortcomings in the implementation of reforms, and in particular 
in the way the business of government is conducted, remain a deterrent to pri- 
vate investor activity. The survey evidence relates to the CIS, but it is con- 
sistent-though  the problems are less intense-with  EBRD experience even 
in the more advanced economies in transition. Key messages from the survey 
include the following: taxes and tax administration are major problems (vague 
tax laws with little rationality across firms, and haphazard and sometimes cor- 
rupt implementation), laws and regulations are seen as burdensome and ever 
changing, there is continuing uncertainty about the institutional and regulatory 
regime, and there is little confidence in the ability of  the administration to 
enforce property rights and contracts or to control crime and corruption. 
The survey was conducted among enterprises worldwide and therefore al- 
lows comparisons of  the severity of these investment deterrents with those for 
other regions. The results reproduced in table 2.5  confirm that the transition 
economies of the CIS still face significant challenges in improving their invest- 
ment climate-for  domestic investors but even more so if they are to compete 
successfully with other locations for FDI. The consequences that (largely tran- 
sition specific) deficiencies in the administrative and regulatory environment 
regime, competition policy, banking reform, and development of securities markets and nonbank 
financial institutions. 
22. As we  argue in section 2.1.4 below, the  high degree of correlation between progress in 
transition and FDI may  also partly result from causality running the opposite way, from FDI  to 
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can have for investors are also demonstrated by the EBRD’s experience, which 
is described with the help of examples in appendix A. 
Additional factors that are hard to separate from our measure of transition 
are likely to have played a role in location decisions. They include in particular 
the proximity (both physical and cultural) of investment locations to Western 
markets and the prospects for market (and political) integration with the Euro- 
pean Union. These factors, which are particularly relevant for cost-motivated 
investments (as opposed to those seeking new markets), are themselves closely 
associated with the achievements in market-oriented reform, partly because 
the prospect of accession to the European Union has served to stimulate the re- 
form commitment, and partly because Association Agreements with the Euro- 
pean Union have brought early benefits of market access and massive technical 
assistance. This close relationship between prospects for EU accession and the 
depth of reforms may also contribute to the motives for FDI, which we analyze 
in the following section. 
Motives for Foreign Direct Investment 
The distinction between market and cost motives for foreign investment has 
been central to a variety of surveys of FDI in the economies in transition. One 
pattern that emerges very  clearly is the predominance of  market seeking as 
the prime investment motive. Factor cost considerations appear to be of less 
importance for the majority of  investments. However, an EBRD survey (de- 
scribed in appendix B) shows that, while market seeking is indeed the domi- 
nant motive for a majority of the investments in the sample, the type of  FDI 
varies significantly according to the host country’s progress in economic transi- 
ti~n.~~  FDI projects in countries that are more advanced in transition are more 
likely to be export oriented, more integrated into the foreign parent’s multina- 
tional production process, and more likely to exploit the comparative advan- 
tage of the host economy.” 
In examining the relationship between project function and host country 
characteristics (using a multinomial logit model), the host country transition 
indicator was found to be a significant determinant of  the functional mix of 
projects operating in each country.25  Results are reported in table 2.6, which 
23. The following discussion draws on Lankes and Venables (1996), which describes the EBRD 
survey results in greater detail. 
24. In light of our earlier discussion about the investment climate it is useful to note that a 
country’s level of transition relates also to the likelihood of successful implementation. One point 
“up” in the transition indicator of a country is associated with an 80 percent fall in the chance of 
a project’s being eventually abandoned or postponed. 
“Export-oriented investors stress the importance of production cost reduction in general and 
the availability of cheap skilled labor in particular-this  is the single most important motivating 
factor in their investment decision. In the sample, salaries of skilled workers in export investments 
are at 16 percent of their Western (parent company) level, while productivity is reported to be, on 
average, 72 percent of the Western level. Since other, unspecified cost factors are less advanta- 
geous, overall unit costs of exporters represent 67 percent of those in western Europe. 
25. The EBRD’s 1995 transition indicators were used in these calculations for consistency with 
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Table 2.6  Host Characteristics and Functional Type 
Local Supply/  Export/  Export/ 
Distribution  Distribution  Local Supply 
Relative probability at mean  3.0  1.8  0.61 
Percentage change in relative 
probability per unit change  115  596  224 
in transition indicator  (1.2)  (2.5)  (1.9) 
Note: Number of observations is 140. Numbers in parentheses are f-statistics. 
presents the changes in relative probabilities associated with a one-point in- 
crease in the transition indicator. Increasing the transition indicator increases 
the probability that the project is engaged in local supply relative to distribu- 
tion. It also increases the probability that it is export oriented, relative to either 
local supply or distribution; the latter effect is particularly large and is statisti- 
cally significant.26  These results may be partly explained by  the relation be- 
tween costs and flexibility in production and the depth of reforms. Administra- 
tive discretion and trade barriers raise direct costs and can complicate logistics. 
The survey suggests that first-mover advantage is an important strategic motive 
among investors aiming at serving local markets. Efficiency-seeking  export in- 
vestors, on the other hand, focus more on costs and may therefore wait for the 
obstacles that raise costs (and risks) to recede. 
A further result throwing some light on the process of integration into inter- 
national production networks-especially  if  viewed in conjunction with the 
association between transition and export orientation-is  that a project’s posi- 
tion within the production chain of its multinational parent corporation differs 
by  project function. An  export investment is somewhat further “upstream” 
within the multinational’s production chain and sells almost half its product 
within the corporation (i.e., to the parent company or other subsidiaries), while 
for a “market investment” the share is only 3 percent. In both cases, input 
supply is roughly one-third from within the corporation (imports). “Vertical 
FDI”-that  is, the cross-border relocation of parts of the production chain- 
seems to be particularly prevalent among German investors, who, as men- 
tioned in section 2.1.2, have concentrated almost exclusively on central Euro- 
pean locations. 
Portfolio Investments and Commercial Bank Lending 
As we have  seen, bond purchases and commercial bank lending were the 
first to follow FDI into the region in significant amounts, with equity funds 
next in line and money market investments and direct offers of equity abroad 
much more recent phenomena. Again, the central European advanced reform- 
ers led the way, but the recent explosive growth in these markets is very much 
26. Alternative specifications were investigated, allowing for the effect of measures of country 
size and controlling for industrial sector. These variables were not significant and did not change 
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dominated by Russia. We shall argue that bank lending has built on relation- 
ships established over time with counterparts in the region and on the tech- 
niques of structured finance, while perceptions of short-term  risk and return op- 
portunities in the region’s financial markets have played a greater role in port- 
folio flows. As mentioned, our discussion of the determinants of  these flows 
in the following has to rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, much of  it 
drawn from the lending experience of the EBRD. 
Commercial banks were the main source of external funds for eastern Eu- 
rope and the USSR during the 1980s. During that period, close working rela- 
tionships were built with foreign trade banks. These relationships survived the 
uncertainty and debt defaults of the early transition years, though the volume 
and nature of lending changed. Commercial banks participated in export fi- 
nance insured by export credit agencies and provided short-term trade finance 
collateralized with balances on correspondent accounts. By 1992-93, as trade 
flows between central and western Europe surged. terms on these transactions 
began to soften for central European obligor banks (see table 2.7 for confirma- 
tion fees on letters of credit). Collateral requirements were gradually replaced 
by  uncovered forms of documentary credit and medium-term refinancing fa- 
cilities. Between 1993 and 1994, for instance, Komercni Banka. :I  prominent 
Czech bank, was able to lengthen maturities on export refinance transactions 
from eighteen months to three years while spreads fell sharply. While Japanese 
banks made their first significant entry on that market in those years, contribut- 
ing to greater competition, most of the lending operations were conducted with 
western European banks that had long-standing relationships with Komercni 
and other large Czech institutions. Project finance developed during that period 
in the context of  FDI projects and syndications with  international financial 
institutions such as the EBRD. This was assisted by improvements in the legal 
basis for secured lending. 
Nonguaranteed bank-to-bank operations with the countries of  the former 
Soviet Union took more time to develop, partly because of the more unsettled 
macroeconomic and regulatory environments and partly because-unlike  in 
eastern Europe-new  private banks quickly came to dominate the banking 
sectors in these countries and relationships took more time to reb~ild.~’  Again, 
cash-collateralized trade finance was often the first step in this process. By 
1996, on the basis of lengthening track records, Russian bank-to-bank lending 
and project finance had become well established, though other CIS countries, 
generally with weaker banking systems, were lagging behind.28 
When commercial bank lending expanded rapidly in  1995-97,  this was 
mostly on the basis of  such previous relationships. As we  noted in section 
27. Except for Vneshekonombank, successor to the former Soviet trade bank, which continued 
to enjoy privileged access to funding from its established Western banking partners. 
28. From 1996, demand for EBRD trade guarantee facilities, which insured counterparty risk 
for Western confirming banks by way of standby letters of  credit, gradually declined from some 
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Table 2.7  Indications of Confirmation Fees on Letters of Credit for Transition 
Economies, 1995 
Indication of 
Country  Confirmation Fees (CILC)  Availability 
Albania  Case by case  Very difficult 
Armenia  Nothing available 
Azerbaijan  Nothing available 
Belarus  Case by case  Very difficult 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  Nothing available 
Bulgaria  5% or more p.a. 
Croatia  Varies by bank 
Czech Republic  1% p.a.  Up to 7 years available 
Estonia  5% or more p.a.  Up to 5 years possible 
Georgia  Nothing available 
HW9-Y  2% p.a.  Up to 5 years possible 
Kazakhstan  Nothing available 
Kyrgyzstan  Nothing available 
Latvia  5% or more p.a. 
Lithuania  5% or more p.a. 
FYR Macedonia  Case by case  Up to 1 year possible 
Poland  1% p.a.  Up to 7 years 
Moldova  Nothing available 
Romania  5% p.a.  Up to 5 years 
Russia  5% p.a.  360 days maximum, certain banks only 
Slovak Republic  1% p.a.  Up to 5 years 
Slovenia  1% p.a.  Up to 7 years 
Tajikistan  Nothing available 
Turkmenistan  Nothing available 
Ukraine  Nothing available 
Uzbekistan  Nothing available 
YugoslavialSerbia  Nothing available 
Source: Jardine Credit Insurance Ltd. 
Up to 360 days for two main banks 
Up to 3 years possible for certain banks 
Up to 3 years, certain banks only 
Up to 3 years, certain banks only 
2.1.2, bank-to-bank lending appears to have dominated the surge. In addition, 
privatization in many countries moved into a new phase with infrastructure and 
large enterprises increasingly on offer. Privatization revenues for the region as 
a whole increased from US$3 to $4 billion in 1992-94  to $9 billion in 1995.29 
Together with FDI, this has vastly increased the opportunities for project fi- 
nance. Infrastructure financing raised from foreign banks, for instance, grew 
from $960 million in 1994 to $3 billion in 1995 (World Bank 1997a,  table 2.2). 
The improvement in terms that has accompanied this process over the past two 
years, especially in some countries of eastern Europe, would appear at times 
to have gone further than could be justified by the underlying risk. The sharp 
increase in competition from other sources of capital inflow has been the main 
driving force of the fall in spreads. This perception is shared by  some of the 
29. World Bank (1997a. table A.6.3).  Regionwide data for 1996 are not available. 82  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
EBRD’s Western banking partners, who nevertheless aim to maintain and de- 
velop long-term lending relationships and build market share in a promising 
market beyond what is viewed as a problematic but transitory phenomenon 
(implying low returns in relation to risk). 
Apart perhaps from some of the equity funds that have long been operating 
in the region, supplies of portfolio flows and bond finance have, by their nature, 
relied less on direct relationships built over time and more on highly structured 
transactions. As  in  other markets  they  are motivated in  part by  the well- 
established benefits of portfolio diversification. However, three additional fac- 
tors are likely to have played an even greater role in explaining recent rapid 
movements. The first factor is closely linked with the transition process itself. 
The rapid change associated with transition and the immaturity of local capital 
markets (both in terms of  regulation and liquidity) has opened opportunities 
for short-term arbitrage and has generated lags and leads in the perception of 
underlying risk. The region does not have a history of  credit ratings, and the 
first formal ratings came, for most countries outside central Europe, at a time 
when reforms had already progressed. This rating has put these countries “on 
the map” over the past two years. In 1996-97,  the first credit assignments by 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s were given to Russia, Romania, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Croatia, and the cities of Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod. Partly as a result, international fund manag- 
ers “discovered” the region, and it is interesting to note how the most aggres- 
sive funds have moved from one security to the next successively in search of 
new arbitrage margins (such as from Russia to Ukraine and Bulgaria, or from 
Russian federal T-bills to regional 
The second factor is the liquidity in global markets. Because yields in indus- 
trialized countries have remained low, and emerging market finance has recov- 
ered as memories of the Mexico crisis fade, liquidity has reinforced the greater 
interest in the opportunities offered by the region. A third important factor, fi- 
nally, has been tensions within the macroeconomic policy mix of several coun- 
tries, including Poland in 1995 and the Czech and Slovak Republics and Russia 
in 1996-97.  Significant uncovered interest differentials emerged as the result 
of tight monetary policies, combined with loosening fiscal stances. These of- 
fered investors in money markets (particularly bank deposits) opportunities for 
short-term gain. 
Refemng to our discussion of the relation between risk and progress in tran- 
sition, fundamentals on the side of  demand for finance and of credit quality 
have moved far too gradually to be the explanation for the recent surge in short- 
term capital flows.31  Of  the factors reviewed above, information lags have, in 
30. A Banque Nationale de Paris brochure (1997) refers explicitly to Russian GKOs as being 
“close to their sell-by date.” It goes on to state that “by shopping around, you can equip yourself 
with the necessary breathing apparatus to keep climbing from here.” 
31. The softening of restrictions on foreign participants in the Russian T-bill market since early 
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our view, been the most important in motivating the surge. International liquid- 
ity, macroeconomic policy, and, in Russia, remaining restrictions on security 
markets have reinforced this factor. This suggests that herding may have played 
a role and raises the prospect of  macroeconomic instability associated with 
possible volatility in these flows, problems that are discussed in a little more 
detail in the next section. 
2.1.4  Capital Flows: Consequences 
Capital flows to the transition economies will be of great value in realizing 
the region’s growth potential. The potential productivity (and profitability) of 
new capital is likely to be higher than in more settled market environments. 
The physical and human capital stock in transition economies is large by  the 
standards of  middle-income countries but inefficiently employed and partly 
obsolete. Investment for restructuring, combined with improved management 
and Western technology, offers opportunities for raising the yield of  some of 
the existing capital at relatively low cost. At the same time, domestic financial 
systems are able to offer only limited support to investors, and savings are 
lower than under the earlier regime, especially during the recovery from the 
transition recession when future earnings expectations stimulate consumption. 
Capital flows have, as discussed in section 2.1.2, contributed significantly to 
lowering financing costs. Net capital inflows and associated current account 
deficits can therefore play a useful role in the region’s development if  chan- 
neled into quality investment. However, they also create obligations that will 
have to be serviced, and recent current account deteriorations and rising con- 
sumption have, in some countries, reached worrisome proportions. 
In this section we argue that FDI, in particular, has the qualities most likely 
to stimulate transition and growth. Other forms of capital inflow can also con- 
tribute to the transition process, but they are likely to generate lasting benefits 
only if combined with cautious fiscal and monetary management. 
Broadly  speaking, the transition is  about placing economic interactions 
on a market footing and promoting private and entrepreneurial initiative. Ac- 
cordingly, one can identify three dimensions in the transition process: (1) the 
creation, expansion, and improvement of  markets; (2) the establishment and 
strengthening of institutions, laws, and policies that support the market (includ- 
ing private ownership); and (3) the adoption of behavior patterns and skills that 
have a market perspective. 
Apart from its role in capital accumulation, FDI tends to have a “package” 
of attributes that can make a significant contribution to transition along these 
dimensions through upstream and downstream linkages and demonstration ef- 
fects. It can, for instance, force modern standards of product quality and supply 
that have, on a smaller scale, attracted a  similar surge in interest (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
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reliability on local producers through its procurement management. This can 
both provide learning externalities from which other purchasers can benefit 
and promote market-oriented behavior. In monopolized markets, often a rem- 
nant of the command system, FDI may have the muscle to impose greater com- 
petition. Standards of behavior, including in relation to corporate governance, 
and technology can be transmitted via demonstration effects. And advanced 
marketing methods can have  an impact on distribution systems and market 
logistics as well as competition. In the financial sector, FDI in banks (and eq- 
uity funds) can have particularly broad effects by bringing credit skills and a 
strong element of financial discipline. 
The EBRD assesses transition impact in the context of its investment proj- 
ects. Traditional methods of project appraisal proved ill suited to the task. The 
spotlight in the analysis of transition falls precisely where cost-benefit analysis 
is weakest. Transition focuses on processes rather than outcomes. Of course, 
one looks to processes (here those of  the market) that are thought likely to 
produce good outcomes, but the scope and depth of the changes make explicit 
modeling of  outcomes intractable. We  have developed an approach in which 
the type of impact of a project is assessed and checked against areas in a coun- 
try or sector in which the transition challenge appears particularly great. A 
checklist of  transition impact appears in appendix C. Figure 2.9 reviews the 
structure of  transition impact of  the EBRD’s Russia portfolio and pipeline 
across the seven dimensions of  transition impact identified in the checklist. 
Restructuring and competition are particularly relevant in private sector proj- 
ects, while an emphasis on institution building and policies underpinning mar- 
ket efficiency represent key purposes of the EBRD’s involvement in the state 
sector. 
Bank lending, in the form of project finance, trade credit, and interbank lend- 
ing, can contribute to the transition process through some of the same channels. 
In particular, it can transfer financial technologies and the learning effects as- 
sociated with financial discipline. Similarly, equity flows and the issuing of cor- 
porate bonds can strengthen disclosure, shareholder rights, and other elements 
of  corporate governance. A recent example is the legal battle over minority 
shareholder rights in Russia’s Novolipetsk steel mill, which was won by foreign 
portfolio investors against management. The city of St. Petersburg overhauled 
its finances and took steps toward the commercialization of certain municipal 
services in the context of its international bond issue earlier this year. 
Nevertheless, there are dangers associated with the rapid  rise in capital 
flows. Combined with domestic demand-led growth, and partly fueling it, they 
have contributed to a significant deterioration in current account balances over 
the past two years (fig. 2.10). This raises the question of the vulnerability of 
balances of payments to sudden reversals in short-term flows if risk perceptions 
change. Two areas are of particular concern. First, the financial institutions and 
markets that intermediate part of these funds are still highly immature in many 
countries in transition. Greater liquidity, combined with weak regulation, can 85  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
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Fig. 2.9  Russia: transition impact by class of borrower, stock of projects as of 
April 1997 (percentage of projects associated with each impact) 
Source: EBRD. 
stimulate the accumulation of poor lending portfolios. Over recent months, we 
have seen banks even in the advanced transition countries rushing into transac- 
tions without due diligence. Simultaneously, the growing stability in the mac- 
roeconomic environment and the capital inflows themselves have reduced ear- 
lier sources of easy income for banks on the government securities and foreign 
exchange markets, and foreign funds compete with  local banks by  driving 
down margins on “blue chip” lending. This heightens the risk of bank failures 
and associated dangers of volatility in capital flows. 
Second, the size of  the current account imbalances could lead to volatility 
in expectations if  the associated growth in the debt burden is judged to be 
unsustainable. Table 2.8 provides a grouping of countries into broad categories 
around some indicators of financial imbalance: the sizes of the current account 
and fiscal deficits and the ratios of external debt to exports and GDP. In such a 
broad-brush categorization, the cutoff points for “low,” “medium,” and “high” 
are necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Also, the fiscal deficit criteria should ide- 
ally be expanded to cover “quasi-fiscal deficits” resulting from the state’s in- 
fluence over the activity of banks and enterprises. The accounts of Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, for instance, would then look far worse. Nevertheless, table 2.8 
offers some useful insights. With very few exceptions, the external debt burden 
is not high by international standards. For instance, the Latin American average 
ratio of gross debt to exports (including goods and nonfactor services in the 
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Fig. 2.10  Deterioration in trade balances, 1996 (percentage of GDP) 
Sources: IMF, national authorities, and EBRD estimates. 
among transition economies only by Armenia, Bulgaria, and Georgia. The av- 
erage for all developing countries was 146 percent, compared with 121 percent 
for the transition economies.32 
However, while external debt is not (yet) high, it has been growing very 
rapidly, and  current account deficits have  been  associated with  significant 
budgetary imbalances in several CIS countries. Together with evidence of low 
public investment activity (Kapur and van der Mensbrugghe 1997), this sug- 
gests that a large proportion of foreign funding may serve to meet current out- 
lays that do not improve those countries’ future repayment capacity. Foreign 
borrowing was in some cases explicitly earmarked to reduce budgetary pen- 
sions and wage arrears (e.g., a recent Russian bond issue and a planned Kazakh 
32. Weighted averages. The ratio was almost the same in eastern Europe and the Baltics (123 
percent) and in the CIS (118 percent). 3
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Bulgaria (105)  Armenia (-26.6)  Albania (-12.0)  Armenia (211.4) 
Azerbaijan (-23.6)  Armenia (-9.3)  Bulgaria (204.0)  Tajikistan (90) 
Croatia (-7.6)  Bulgaria (-13.4)  Georgia (33  1.0) 
Czech Republic (- 8.1) 
Estonia (- 10.3)  Moldova (-6.7) 
FYR Macedonia (-7.8)  Russia (-8.3) 
Kyrgyzstan (-23.7)  Tajikistan (-5.3) 
Latvia (-7.2)  Uzbekistan (-7.3) 
Moldova (- 13.1) 
Slovak Republic (- 10.2) 
Tajikistan (- 10.9) 
Uzbekistan (-7.9) 
Sources: IMF, national authorities, and EBRD estimates. 
Categories are “low,” current account deficit is less than -2  percent; “medium,” between -2  percent and -7  percent; and “high,” greater than -7  percent. 
The  fiscal deficit refers to the general government. Categories are “low,” fiscal deficit less than -2  percent; “medium,” between -2  and -5  percent; and “high,” greater than  -5  percent. 
‘Categories are “low,” ratio of  gross external debt to current account revenues smaller or equal to 100, “medium,” between 100 and 200; and ‘high,” greater than 200. Current account 
revenues include merchandise exports and exports of nonfactor services. In the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the gross external debt is divided only by merchandise exports. 
dNet external debt equals gross external debt net of gross reserves of  the monetary authorities. Categories are “low,” ratio of net external debt over GDP smaller or equal to 30 percent; 
“medium,” between 30 and 50 percent; and “high,” greater than 50 percent. 
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issue).33  The association between budgetary and external imbalances is particu- 
larly worrying if viewed against the background of weak fiscal revenue perfor- 
mance across much of the CIS. The vast majority of CIS debt is owed by  sov- 
ereign or sovereign-backed borrowers. Problems of  fiscal sustainability are 
perhaps the most likely source of external instability in the future. 
2.1.5  Prospects and Policies 
A  discussion of  prospects for capital flows to  the region takes us very 
quickly to a discussion of the prospects for transition and to economic policies. 
We  have  seen that flows have been predominantly to countries at more ad- 
vanced stages of transition and to countries with better records on macroeco- 
nomic stability. Thus the underlying advantages of  the region are strong in 
terms of market potential, low cost, and proximity to European markets. It is 
rapid transition and sound economic policies that unlock this potential. 
Over the past two years or so the markets have realized the opportunities 
that are available. There has been a rapid adjustment in perceptions and a ma- 
jor acceleration in flows. Thus FDI has more or less tripled between 1994 and 
1997, with an even more dramatic rise in other flows. FDI in the region is now 
running at around US$40 to $50 per capita, or 2 to 3 percent of GDP. In some 
countries it is more than $200 per capita. It is natural to ask whether this accel- 
eration of flows will continue. In  our judgment it is likely that over the next 
few years FDI in the region will grow further. Growth of output is now positive 
in nearly all economies of the region and is returning in Russia. The rise in 
real exchange rates that has brought a 50 percent increase in the region’s GDP 
in the past three years (notwithstanding zero or negative real output growth) 
is likely to continue, albeit at a slower rate. Thus the next few years will see 
strong market growth. The presence of significant human capital, together with 
the scrapping of  much obsolete capital stock, makes the potential return on 
investment high. As we have emphasized throughout, the crucial additional in- 
gredients are continued transition and sound policy. 
The prospects for other capital flows are more difficult to judge. The rapid 
acceleration of the past two years is, however, unlikely to be maintained since 
it is, as we have suggested, in some part due to a one-off adjustment in percep- 
tions. It should also be kept in mind that the transition has far to go, and in 
some respects, for example financial institutions, it is fragile. There is little 
doubt that political commitment has been remarkably strong through difficult 
times and changing governments, but one must expect setbacks and crises on 
the way. The very high balance-of-payments deficits that have emerged in the 
past year or two (together with capital inflows) are likely to cause problems 
before too long and may result in sharp reactions from the markets. The future 
33. And, in fact, certain state-owned enterprises are said to have borrowed abroad to meet their 
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of very large capital outflows, particularly from Russia, is also hard to predict. 
It is to be hoped that those Russians seeking returns outside Russia will also 
have greater confidence in the high returns to be obtained from domestic in- 
vestment. 
Subject to continued advance in the transition, and greater security of  their 
assets through the legal and administrative systems, investors will be looking 
particularly closely at fiscal policies. It has been monetary policies that have 
led the way in restoring macroeconomic stability with, at times, extraordinarily 
high real rates of interest. If the macroeconomic position is to be secured, the 
fiscal position must be put on a sound long-term basis. In many countries there 
are still difficult adjustments to make on both the revenue and expenditure 
sides. As a broad generalization we can say that in the western part of the re- 
gion the challenges will be particularly severe in controlling expenditure, and 
in the east in raising revenue. As on most dimensions of the transition, improv- 
ing policy on the fiscal front requires careful attention not only to building 
institutions but also to promoting and enforcing responsible behavior both in- 
side and outside government. While the first phase of the transition can be seen 
in terms of liberalization and privatization, the next phase involves the building 
and deepening of these institutions  and behavior. These processes will take 
time, but in  most countries of  the region the next phase of  transition is un- 
der way. 
Appendix A 
Obstacles to Investment: The EBRD’S Experience 
Each year, the EBRD invests about US$3 billion in over 100 projects. Including 
the investments made by sponsors of these projects and other financial inves- 
tors, the total investment in Bank-supported  projects  amounts to about $10 
billion per year. This figure corresponds to roughly 5 percent of total fixed in- 
vestment in the Bank’s countries of operations. Since the Bank is active in all 
its countries of operations, this participation in investment throughout the re- 
gion generates a considerable body of experience that underpins its analysis 
and understanding of the obstacles to growth that are associated with failures 
in the investment climate. 
Perhaps the most fundamental lesson from the Bank‘s experience for private 
investment is its severely limited scope in the absence of macroeconomic stabi- 
lization and of basic structural reforms (such as price and trade liberalization, 
privatization of small-scale enterprises, and elimination of directed credits and 
interest rate controls in credit markets). In such a climate for investment, finan- 
cially viable private investment projects tend to be restricted to those that oper- 91  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
ate as enclaves within the local economy. Such projects are often capital-inten- 
sive projects in the natural resource sector, where the capital inputs are sourced 
from abroad and the output is exported. The main locally provided inputs are 
labor and transportation services. This type of private investment, while it can 
be of real value, has only limited linkages to the local economy and is unlikely 
to generate the types of  commercial interactions that yield significant spill- 
overs on the productivity of the local private sector. 
With progress in macroeconomic stabilization and basic structural reforms, 
however, the EBRD has been able to expand significantly  its support for private 
investment projects, particularly in the local private sector. Nevertheless, the 
Bank often encounters a number of  obstacles related to government policies 
and practices. The examples that follow serve to illustrate our experiences. 
While they have been expressed in general terms to avoid reference to specific 
projects, they are based on concrete and sometimes painful experiences. 
Corporate Taxation 
A pervasive problem in private investment projects throughout the region is 
the lack of predictability of tax rules (a problem that can be exacerbated by the 
retroactive implementation of some measures) and the arbitrary and discrimi- 
natory enforcement of  taxation (e.g., many domestic enterprises accumulate 
tax arrears and enjoy exemptions while compliance by enterprises that are not 
so favored, including foreign companies, is strictly enforced). The level of 
taxes for the honest taxpayer who is not privileged with exemptions can be 
punitive, and many potentially viable projects do not come to fruition for this 
reason. 
A second set of problems related to corporate taxation is the inability to de- 
duct certain legitimate business expenses (e.g., part of interest payments, train- 
ing, and travel) and the distortions that arise from the structure of depreciation 
allowances. The Bank is involved in a number of projects in the region (which 
are viable over the medium term) that are currently running at a loss according 
to International  Accounting Standards but that are nevertheless paying substan- 
tial profit taxes because of the peculiarities of the accounting and tax systems. 
In one case, these taxes amount to close to US$lOO million. 
Product Markets 
Barter transactions among enterprises are prevalent in some countries and 
sectors. It appears that barter transactions serve to conceal profits and to stifle 
competition. The use of barter can be exacerbated by sometimes severe liquid- 
ity problems and prevents the financial viability of otherwise viable projects. 
Enterprises (Including Infrastructure and the Environment) 
Excessive licensing and regulation of businesses often contribute to bureau- 
cratic  obstacles  to  business  formation  and  investment.  For  example,  one 92  Hans Peter Lankes and Nicholas Stern 
EBRD-supported project required seventy signatures from officials to clear 
all applicable licensing and regulatory hurdles. Such government policies and 
practices fuel corruption and inhibit investment. 
EBRD support for the privatization of some enterprises has placed it in the 
position of minority shareholder with the government retaining an influential 
role in corporate control. In some investments, governments have used their re- 
sidual ownership stakes to pursue noncommercial objectives, including politi- 
cal patronage. This has involved privileged sales of  shares at special prices to 
enterprise managers after outsiders have been sold shares at higher prices and 
the manipulation of  share registers. Such actions cut against the objective of 
instilling a strong commercial orientation in enterprises through privatization. 
Also, they obviously discourage outside investors from buying shares, thereby 
eliminating an important source of finance and corporate governance. 
Many dominant infrastructure enterprises remain largely unreformed, de- 
spite the potential for de-monopolization and for increasing competition in the 
provision of services. In addition, the structure of infrastructure tariffs contin- 
ues to place a heavy burden on business customers, with the structure of tariffs 
often inverted (i.e., with businesses paying tariffs that are five and six times 
those paid by  households, despite the higher costs of  delivering services to 
households; see, e.g., EBRD 1996). 
The region has relatively little experience with regulatory institutions and 
practices, and only a handful of countries in the region have established inde- 
pendent regulatory agencies. Several EBRD-supported and other commercial 
infrastructure projects have been adversely affected by arbitrary regulatory ac- 
tions and by  adverse court rulings, contributing to investor caution. These ac- 
tions have included the withdrawal of previously agreed licenses, the failure to 
implement agreed tariff increases, and the imposition of misguided restrictions 
on competition. 
The tolerance of  payments arrears in the energy sector (primarily by  large 
state-owned industries and local governments) severely curtails the financial 
viability of  projects, as does the extensive use of barter. It is also limited by 
the failure to implement tariffs that reflect the incremental costs of production 
and the financial constraints of  government (although the EBRD recognizes 
that there are social constraints to the instantaneous introduction of  such tar- 
iffs). Taken together these problems have inhibited the flow of private invest- 
ment into power generation and distribution. As a result, EBRD activity in this 
sector has also been held back. 
Financial Markets and Institutions 
In some countries, governments have sought in effect to nationalize finan- 
cially viable private banks with which the EBRD was associated through di- 
rected mergers with state-owned banks. Such actions are in conflict with the 
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vate ownership of commercial banks, and the possibility of such actions inhib- 
its investment in the sector. 
Connected lending by commercial banks remains a pervasive practice in the 
region and has been a principal cause of several bank failures. 
Accounting standards remain inadequate from the perspectives both of in- 
ternal financial control of banks and of prudential regulation. Rapid movement 
to International Accounting Standards remains a priority. 
Failure of government to implement effectively the prudential regulation of 
banks and other financial institutions has contributed to financial instability 
that has adversely affected the performance of  otherwise sound banks with 
which the EBRD is involved. 
Legal Institutions 
In contrast to the countries in eastern Europe and the Baltic region, those in 
the CIS have no prewar experience with commercial and civil codes. While 
such codes have now been established in much of the region, this lack of com- 
mercial traditions has meant that there is relatively little understanding of the 
functioning of these codes. This in turn may contribute to a lack of respect for 
the laws, weak judicial enforcement, and reliance on private enforcement of 
agreements. Some EBRD projects have experienced a range of  arbitrary in- 
terventions by local government-for  example, attempting to expropriate the 
project company’s output and to prevent its export. 
Appendix B 
EBRD Investor Survey 
In January  1995, the EBRD conducted an investor  They contacted 
11,000 firms worldwide. Of the 1,435 firms that responded, 628 indicated that 
they were willing to be interviewed at the senior executive level. Executives 
from 117 of these firms with 145 investments in eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union were interviewed between June and November 1995. To qualify 
for the survey, a company needed to have an operational, planned, postponed, 
or abandoned project in the mining or manufacturing sector of an EBRD coun- 
try of  operation; in addition, its headquarters had to be in western Europe. 
The 145 surveyed investments cover sixteen economies in transition, employ 
39,000 workers, and have a total foreign equity contribution of US$2.8 billion. 
A summary description of  investment projects in the survey is presented in 
table 2B. 1. 
34. A fuller presentation of the survey is contained in Lankes and Venables (1 996). Table 2B.1  Summary Description of Investment Projects in EBRD Survey 
~  ~~ 
Country (Group)  Status  Function  Control Mode 
Czech Republic and Hungary (Group I)  44  Planned 
Poland, Baltics, and other eastern  57  Operating 
38  Distribution  24  Licenseor  16 
91  Supply of  72  Joint venture  72 
subcontract  and services 
Europe (Group 11)  regional or local 
markets 
abandoned  region  foreign parent 
Russia and other CIS (Group In)  44  Postponed or  16  Exports from the  44  Wholly owned by  53 
Total  145  145  140  141 95  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
Appendix C 
Qualitative Aspects of Transition Impact of Projects: 
A Checklist 
The following checklist covers only those potential effects of a project on the 
host country that relate to the conversion from a command economy to an 
economy driven by  well-functioning markets. It does not cover direct income 
and resource effects of a project, and it covers environmental impact only in- 
directly to the extent that it is a consequence of  the broadening and deepen- 
ing of  markets. Applications of the checklist should therefore be viewed in 
conjunction with an analysis of the financial and economic rate of return and 
of the wider environmental impact of a project. The checklist is “generic” in 
the sense that, in principle, its categories fit all project types (e.g., small and 
medium-sized infrastructure projects and technical assistance). 
Project Contributions to the Structure and Extent of Markets 
1.  Greater competition in the project sector: A project can promote greater 
competition in its sector of activity. Increased competitive pressure is likely to 
improve the efficiency with which resources are utilized, demand is satisfied, 
and innovation is stimulated. However, in some circumstances a project might 
lead to a slackening of  competitive pressure on market participants, including 
the project company itself. 
2. Expansion of competitive or market interactions in other sectors: A proj- 
ect can help to set business relationships in other markets on a more competi- 
tive footing. The benefits for the transition process would be similar to those 
described under point 1 above. There are two important ways in which markets 
can be extended and their functioning improved by projects: (i) through inter- 
actions of the project entity with suppliers and clients and (ii) through project 
contributions to the integration of economic activities into the national or inter- 
national economy, in particular by lowering the cost of transactions. 
To have a structural effect, these contributions should not be one-off but 
should enhance competitive market interactions on a sustained basis. This 
would generally be achieved either through the formation of actors, methods 
of work, policies, and institutions that last, or through interactions that have a 
strong demonstration effect. 
Project Contributions to the Institutions 
and Policies That Support Markets 
3. More widespread private ownership: A project may result in increased 
private ownership through privatization, or new private provision of goods and 
services. This can generally be expected to strengthen market-oriented behav- 
ior, innovation, the pool of entrepreneurship, and, more generally, commitment 
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tive. With the right kind of business standards, regulation, and legal environ- 
ment, private ownership is complementary to, and often a condition for, the 
expansion and improvement of markets. 
4.  Institutions, laws, and policies that promote markethnctioning and efi- 
ciency: A project may help to create or reform governmental or private institu- 
tions, policies, and practices whose function is to enhance entrepreneurship 
and the efficiency of  resource allocation. This is particularly relevant where 
not only the project entity itself but also other economic activities benefit. Four 
types of  contribution are of  particular importance here: (i) the creation and 
strengthening of  public and private institutions that support the efficiency of 
markets; (ii) improvements to the functioning of regulatory entities and prac- 
tices; (iii) project contributions to government policy formation and commit- 
ment, promoting competition, predictability, and transparency; and (iv) con- 
tributions to laws that strengthen the private sector and the open economy. 
Project Contributions to Market-Based Conduct, Skills, and Innovation 
5. Transfer and dispersion of skills: Projects can directly contribute to pro- 
viding and improving the skills required for well-functioning market econo- 
mies. This may include management, procurement, marketing, financial, and 
banking skills. Such a transfer represents a relevant transition impact only 
when the skills are likely to be spread so as to benefit nonproject entities (oth- 
erwise they are simply costs like any others). Skill transfers are often comple- 
mentary to other transition-related project impacts such as institution building, 
market expansion, and demonstration effects. 
6. Demonstration of new replicable behavior and activities: A project may 
lead the way by showing other economic actors what is feasible and profitable 
and thereby inviting replication. Three types of  demonstration effect are of 
particular importance here: (i) demonstration of  products and processes that 
are new to the economy, (ii) demonstration of ways of successfully restructur- 
ing companies and institutions, and (iii) demonstration to both domestic and 
foreign financiers of ways and instruments to finance activities. 
7.  Setting standards for corporate governance and business conduct: By 
implementing high standards of corporate governance and business conduct in 
entities supported by  the EBRD, projects may contribute to the spreading of 
behavior and attitudes that enhance the legitimacy and functioning of the mar- 
ket economy. This is a form of demonstration effect that functions by establish- 
ing reference points for other firms and individuals concerning businesses that 
they wish to invest in or interact with. Where role models for business conduct 
and corporate governance are rare, such pressures are less likely to materialize. 
A difference with institutional change, as discussed under point 4, is that such 
behavior may not be codified in a formal way. 97  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
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2. W. Michael Blumenthal 
When our chairman used his seductive methods and superior persuasive pow- 
ers to talk me into coming here and I accepted in a fit of absentmindedness, I 
wondered what it was that I could contribute. Since he asked me to tell war 
stories, that is what I now propose to do; so you’re going to hear something 
that is very much at the microlevel, not at all macro as all the presentations so 
far have been. 
Gil Dim touched on country-specific factors that are sui generis and have to 
do with elements we  don’t  immediately think about, such as the quality of 
human resources, the people we work with. He referred to that in connection 
with what is happening in banks and mentioned historical factors in the way 
that people relate to each other and how they work together. I agree that when 
you  talk about the functioning of  capital flows, it eventually comes down to 
what happens with very small groups of actors in the economy and their inter- 
actions. 
I shall only talk about one country, Russia. First of all, I want to stress that 
when you  consider capital flows to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, you are often lumping together countries that are really quite different. 
Second, even within Russia, it is extremely difficult to generalize. I noticed 98  W. Michael Blumenthal 
Martin Feldstein wrote an op-ed piece called “Russia’s Rebirth.” If he’s respon- 
sible for this title, I warn him: Just because you wander around the streets of 
Moscow you  can’t conclude anything definitive about what is happening in, 
for example, the places where we operate in the Pacific part of Russia-Kha- 
barovsk or Sakhalin Island. That’s a different world altogether, and you need 
to look at these places as well, to get some sense of what is happening in the 
country as a whole. Moscow and St. Petersburg are not like the rest. The Far 
East is not like European Russia; Siberia’s smaller towns are very, very differ- 
ent, both in the way  in which they are run and in the way  in which business 
is conducted. 
The third point I want to make with regard to Russia is that it is a country 
of enormous contrasts. You can find anything you want there. One reads a lot 
about crime in Russia, and there certainly is a tremendous amount of that. Yet 
there are also instances of sublime honesty in Russia, and a lot of things you 
can do that could only be accomplished with hardworking, honest people. It is 
easy to lose lots of  money on Russian investments. But there are also huge 
opportunities to make lots of money (I will give you a couple of examples to 
illustrate both experiences). More and more people are better off, and one no- 
tices this, particularly among younger people. But there are as many or more 
Russian citizens who are still substantially worse off than they used to be, par- 
ticularly the older ones. 
Let me tell you something about the environment in which the U.S. Russia 
Investment Fund (TUSRIF) operates. I shall then say a few words about TUS- 
RIF itself and cite a few examples of  both successes and failures we  have 
experienced in our operations. 
First of all, the positives. We find much in Russia today that is a lot better 
than when we started up three years ago. In 1992 inflation was 2,500 percent; 
in April of this year it was 15 percent. They’re talking about a budget-and 
I  should say,  numbers in  Russia are very, very  iffy; statistics are orders of 
magnitude-that  projects only about 5 percent inflation. Well, if it’s  12 or 15 
percent, it’s still pretty good from where we’ve come, and it’s clearly gone in 
the right direction. The budget deficit has been reduced. There was huge nega- 
tive growth a few years ago. Now it’s level, or maybe it’s up a percent or two, 
and that’s tremendous progress. One hundred and twenty thousand enterprises 
have been privatized in Russia in a very short period of time, and many, many 
more (we don’t know how many) start-ups were launched. If you walk around 
any of  the cities you  see the kiosks and the new stores. All of  that has to 
be counted in. Much of  it did not exist before. We estimate that one-third of 
the population lived below the subsistence level three or four years ago. The 
number is still large, but it’s much less now,  maybe 20 percent. There are 
other indications of progress. Unfortunately, perhaps, car registrations are one 
index; those have doubled in two years. Russia now expects to be registering 
1.5 million new cars each year over the next couple of years. A lot of capital 
is also suddenly flowing in. Russia has become exciting and fashionable for 99  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
speculators and general investors. The stock market is booming; it tripled in 
eighteen months. There is more direct investment of the kind we’re making. 
Clearly, things have moved  faster than anyone would have expected two to 
three years ago. 
But there are still huge long-term problems. They will be slow to resolve. 
The result is that the risk-reward ratio works with a vengeance, unlike anyplace 
else in the world I’ve ever seen. The tax system is a mess. Taxes are high, and 
jurisdictions overlap. There is total uncertainty about what will hit you. Tax 
administration is arbitrary; official promises and commitments are broken. Lo- 
cal authorities don’t pay attention to the center and vice versa, and direct invest- 
ment under those circumstances requires a strong stomach. There is large-scale 
evasion of taxes, which makes it very difficult for an outside honest investor be- 
cause you compete with others who do not pay their taxes. On the other hand, 
for a non-Russian investor to make the right investments and to engage in the 
same kind of evasion that Russians do would carry particular risks, which cer- 
tainly we and our fund cannot accept. That is something any private investor has 
to consider very carefully. 
Moreover, the judiciary is often corrupt and generally underpaid. Laws and 
regulations are a morass, arbitrarily enforced or not enforced at all. Sometimes 
they are illegally enforced. It is very difficult to enforce your rights once you’ve 
signed a contract. For example, you  can find your equity interest suddenly 
heavily diluted, contrary to a prior agreement, with your partners selling stock 
without telling you. Also, there are no dependable financial data. Audited state- 
ments are hard to come by. Bureaucratic inertia and late payment of debts is 
common. 
Some of  you  may  have read a long article about a place named Leninsk 
Kusninsky, which is reputed to be run by  gangsters. It is a rather large city, 
where the most important man is a fellow with the interesting Russian title of 
“Killer.” He uses this English word to describe what he does to keep things in 
line. That’s an extreme example, of course. Petty crime is much more common. 
We tried to invest in a string of sandwich shops in the subways of Moscow, for 
example. In the end we didn’t because we found that those places have to pay 
for protection and we didn’t feel we could be a part of that. There are, of course, 
also plenty of instances of crime or corruption at a very high level, where assets 
were picked up for practically nothing as they were privatized. 
Why then, would anybody invest in Russia under those circumstances? The 
reason simply is that the potential is great, for those who are greedy and willing 
to take risks. Arminio Fraga asked, Why would anybody stick around? The 
answer is greed-the  potential for very large returns. 
Turning now to TUSRIF. What is it? It is an acronym for the U.S. Russia 
Investment Fund. It grew out of  1993 U.S. commitments made in the course 
of G-7 meetings in Vancouver and Tokyo to help in the restructuring of Russia. 
TUSRIF is one of the U.S. enterprise funds that were originally organized for 
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tion had the good sense to pick up these programs and to continue them. The 
fund is organized and funded by the U.S. government but operates like a pri- 
vate investment fund, with a private board of directors. The chairman is ap- 
pointed by the president, as are the directors. The fund reports to the govern- 
ment-our  contact point is the Agency for International Development-but 
operates independently with minimal or no interference. We report, of course, 
both to the Congress and to the executive.  We presently have an authorized cap- 
italization of $440 million, of which less than half has as yet been funded. Our 
offices are in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinberg, Rostov on the Don, Kha- 
barovsk, Vladivostok, and Sakhalin. 
To date we have invested about $100 million in 22 large and medium-sized 
businesses, $10 to $15 million in 135 small businesses, $5 million in a micro- 
lending program,  and  about $1 million in technical assistance money con- 
nected with our various projects. Total employment in the various enterprises 
is about 20,000 people, and the projects cover many industries, from communi- 
cations to publishing, beverages, textiles, wood manufacturing, retailing, food 
processing, and consumer services. 
Let me now cite three examples to illustrate how these kinds of investments 
in Russia can work, both those that did well and the ones that went sour. 
An investment of the first type is a bottled water company. We  invested $2 
million in equity. (Incidentally, we can make equity or debt investments, or a 
combination of  the two.) The company’s revenue in 1995 was $3 million, in 
1996 $10 million, and in the first six months of this year $11 million. We think 
it’ll be about $25 million for the year as a whole. So we’ve gone in two years 
from $3 million to $25 million. Profits were $200,000 in 1995 and will be 
about $2 million this year, and we hope to double them again next year. Our 
partner is the Russian Orthodox Church, and it makes sure that nobody holds 
us up. The Church, thus, is a good partner. Bottled water is a consumer product 
much in demand in Russia. We  think we could already sell our stake for a 
multiple of the $2 million we invested. So that has been a very good and suc- 
cessful story for us. 
A second good story concerns a pharmaceutical distributor. Same kind of si- 
tuation: the first year saw $37 million in revenue, second year $60 million, and 
this year $100 million; quadrupling of profit and lots of opportunity to make 
more money in the future. 
The third  success story concerns a string of breweries. Net sales in 1994 
were $43 million, in 1995 $108 million, in 1996 $180 million, and in the first 
six months of this year $150 million, so we’ll do over $300 million. Profits: we 
had a loss in  1994, $370,000 in 1995, $3.7 million in  1996, and we estimate 
higher numbers this year. These are obviously very attractive results. 
But perhaps you  are more interested in our failures, which illustrate some 
of the problems you can run into in Russia. 
We  invested in a supermarket chain in the Far East, a joint venture among 
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nomic zone of Nachotka, a Russian bank, and a U.S. supermarket chain. We 
committed $8 million and began with a bridge loan of  $3 million to the en- 
terprise, which we have since written off. What happened? We found that the 
management lacked the skills to run such an activity. We found that they with- 
held the truth from us, hid their problems, and sent us inaccurate numbers. 
Cash disappeared or was wasted. Wrong equipment was bought. 
Then the partners disagreed with each other. The U.S. partner wouldn’t de- 
liver. And there was large-scale pilfering in the region where they were oper- 
ating. As the company was going down, the Russian bank, which is one of the 
smallest creditors, filed suit. Our office is in Moscow, and our lawyers are in 
Moscow, but the bank is right there in Vladivostok and knows the judiciary. 
The court grabbed the assets to which the bank had a substantially subordi- 
nated claim, even though the bank had made an agreement with us acknowl- 
edging that we had a superseding claim, which it did not tell the judge about. 
The judge, when he heard about the agreement, said it was not relevant. We 
appealed in Moscow, because in theory the Moscow courts have jurisdiction. 
Moscow agreed with us but has so far been unable to get the relevant parties 
in Vladivostok to answer the telephone. We have written off the $3 million. 
The second example of  a problem case is a $2.5 million investment in a 
very nice plywood manufacturing activity in a place called Kostroma. Based 
on technical expertise from a British plywood manufacturer, we financed the 
equipment. Everything was going along swimmingly-we  were exporting the 
product and making a profit. The local tax authorities, I guess, needed money 
and decided that they would pay  the value-added tax rebate on  exports, no 
longer on the basis of  documentary evidence that the product has been ex- 
ported, but only after the product has been received in the foreign country, 
which, moving by ship, takes quite a while. To  get the actual documentation 
back and then to encounter a delay of  roughly four to six months costs the 
company $2 to $3 million in cash flow. It’s a small company; it doesn’t have $2 
to $3 million, so unless its investors have deep pockets and are willing to come 
in and finance that, the company will go bankrupt. There is no appeal for this 
kind of thing. We don’t have the Russian Orthodox Church, in this instance, to 
come and help us, and we now face a very difficult problem of what to do. We 
are looking for a solution. 
Finally, you run into tax avoidance schemes and questions all the time. It is 
customary in Russia to pay off the import and customs authorities so that they 
will allow you to bring in equipment without paying full duty. It’s done all the 
time, but we don’t do it. It’s also common to use short-term dummy corpora- 
tions, which are later abandoned, in order to avoid taxes, or to set up an off- 
shore purchasing company to buy the raw material, sell it to the manufacturing 
company, and accumulate most of the profit offshore, which is then never re- 
ported, or to use a short-term dummy corporation to avoid paying the value- 
added tax. We  looked at a manufacturing company that showed $10 to $15 
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paid any taxes. The problem for an honest foreign investor is how to compete 
with that. 
I would end by  saying that a country as large as Russia, with no historical 
memory of operating a free enterprise system, with seventy years’ experience 
with a bureaucratically run socialist system, but with many wonderful human 
and natural resources, will have  a substantial impact on international capital 
flows. That is beginning with the stock market, but it can move very quickly in 
either direction. As you assess the opportunities and the impact on the global 
system, it is important to look behind the global numbers at the reality of the 
problems that have to be faced within a country, in order to judge which direc- 
tion things are likely to move. 
3. JiE  Weigl 
I have to point out at the beginning that the paper by Lankes and Stern includes 
an excellent amount of information regarding the capital flows to my  region, 
and I appreciated reading it, not only from the point of view of personal inter- 
est, but as background for my work at the prime minister’s office. I think it is 
a very good analysis. It allows a better understanding of what is going on, so 
the EBRD is doing a very good job. 
Surprisingly, I am going to cover the same topic that was discussed here for 
an hour and a half. It is the exchange rate issue and the introduction of convert- 
ibility in the transforming economies of central and eastern Europe. I would 
like to concentrate on the Czech case, which I know best. I think it represents 
a case study of successful and far-reaching transformation, but on the other 
hand, this year it became popular for a different reason. It hosted the first ex- 
ample of a currency shake-up coming from international capital markets, quite 
a new phenomenon in the transforming economies in central and eastern Eu- 
rope. 
Before I start, I would like to stress that my remarks and conclusions do not 
necessarily reflect the official positions of my government. 
Back  to  the exchange rate  problem. A  radical opening of  the economy 
through the liberalization of current account transactions was considered one 
of the cornerstones of our transformation, and the selection of  an appropriate 
exchange rate regime was a precondition for the success of this initial phase of 
the transformation. At that time-the  beginning of the 1990s-the  prevailing 
economic advice we  received propounded the advantages of  anchoring the 
economy to one fixed point: the exchange rate. This would be the firm point 
according to which all the volatile variables would settle down and somehow 
stabilize, and it would enable us to weather the turbulent initial phase after the 
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eventually we  accepted it in cooperation with the people from the EMF.  The 
system functioned, remained stable for seventy-six  months (until recently), and 
worked surprisingly well. The empirical evidence shows that fixing the ex- 
change rate has brought about rapid disinflation and stabilization of the econ- 
omy, which was crucial to the success of the transition process as a whole. 
Another key factor in our economic development was the rapid broadening 
of Czech koruna convertibility. It started as so-called internal convertibility for 
commercial transactions, which restricted capital accounts, and then in 1995 
expanded to full current account convertibility, under IMF Article VIII, to- 
gether with significant liberalization of  capital account transactions. So in 
terms of  the degree of convertibility, the Czech Republic has become a front- 
runner among the central and eastern European transforming economies, and 
this policy, together with the general results of the transformation, has had a 
significant impact on capital flows to the country. The economy within the past 
several years, after the transformation shakeout and the accompanying decline 
in production, has started to grow quite rapidly, at a rate reaching 5 percent in 
1995-96. The inflation rate has achieved single digits. The unemployment rate, 
about 3 percent, is among the lowest in Europe, and the budget has been kept 
balanced every year.  Extensive mass privatization has been successfully ac- 
complished. Furthermore, the country has enjoyed remarkable political stabil- 
ity, and up to now has been governed by a reform-minded, conservative govern- 
ment, with strong popular support and a good international reputation. These 
factors, together with low external debt, were reflected in the country’s strong 
credit ratings from rating agencies. Moreover, the Czech Republic was the first 
of  the central and eastern European countries to be admitted to the OECD. 
International financial markets appreciate these developments, and the country 
has enjoyed easy access to foreign capital. By the end of last year foreign direct 
investment exceeded $7 billion, foreign portfolio investments are about $5 bil- 
lion, and enterprise debt has multiplied several times in the past several years. 
So generally speaking, for a long time the Czech economy has produced 
confidence and optimistic expectations. Nevertheless, it was my country that 
this year was the first central European transitional economy to become a vic- 
tim of a wave of currency speculation, similar to that occurring in Asian emerg- 
ing markets. Thus we have to ask ourselves how it could happen. I would return 
to the exchange rate question. I think the fixed exchange rate regime was one 
of the factors at work. Its effects were quite controversial. On the one hand, I 
have  already mentioned its stabilizing role, and I can add its function as an 
efficiency tool, putting pressure on exporters to improve efficiency and com- 
petitiveness because of the inflation differential between the Czech economy 
and its main trading partners. But on the other hand, long-lasting fixed ex- 
change rates practically eliminate exchange rate risk and create very attractive 
conditions for foreign capital, especially speculative flows. Starting with the 
rapid economic recovery in  1993, capital flows were pulled by  very strong 
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privatization of the enterprise sector and, on the government side, the launch- 
ing of many environmental and infrastructural projects that were required by 
international treaties or were simply a precondition for economic recovery, like 
telephones and so forth. 
The extraordinarily high level of gross capital formation became more and 
more dependent on foreign capital inflow, which peaked in 1995 at 17.4 per- 
cent of GDP, when the share of national saving in GDP started to decline. This 
resulted in money supply growth of about 20 percent per year and inflationary 
pressure. Soon the symptoms of overheating in the economy became apparent. 
The situation posed a serious dilemma for economic policymakers. The first 
option was naturally an exchange rate adjustment, but as Moeen Qureshi has 
mentioned, we were confronted with unwanted appreciation pressures, so this 
option was not seen as a realistic solution because it would have exhausted 
the exchange rate cushion necessary for enterprises to  survive this difficult 
restructuring. Maintaining the stabilizing role of the exchange rate fix was still 
seen as the number one priority. 
The fiscal option was even less realistic, because the budget was balanced 
every year, and for political reasons it was practically impossible to achieve a 
fiscal surplus large enough to sterilize the extensive capital inflow. We did not 
want to introduce excessive capital controls, so the central bank was in quite a 
difficult position: what to do? Passive sterilization and high interest rate policy 
only worsened the problem and led to a vicious circle with no solution. High 
interest rates under a regime of  extensive capital account convertibility gave 
banks and companies easy access to foreign debt instruments, and in this envi- 
ronment the effect of domestic interest rate policy was weakened, and competi- 
tion from cheap foreign debt instruments created serious problems for local 
banks fighting with a growing burden of  bad loans. So to escape this policy 
deadlock, the central bank widened the fluctuation band of the koruna, in order 
to increase exchange rate risk for speculators, and followed by greatly liberal- 
izing capital account transactions, enabling capital outflow from the country. 
These actions temporarily terminated the speculative short-term inflows, but 
another, more important challenge started to emerge. 
Since 1995, the current account deficit had grown progressively, driven espe- 
cially by the rapid growth in investment I have already mentioned. The invest- 
ment ratio in  1996 reached the extreme of  33 percent. The growth in invest- 
ment had the shape of  a massive wave, starting from a relatively low initial 
rate, and it was  necessary to expect a relatively long time lag between the 
demand-generating and capacity-generating effects of  the investment. Also, 
the specifics of privatization played an important role in this development. In 
the Czech Republic, where the voucher method of privatization had been ex- 
tensively used, a turbulent process of  ownership concentration was launched 
and became a relatively long-lasting phenomenon. These conditions affected 
the emerging domestic stock market, which has not functioned predominantly 
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existing stock holdings. This has made the Czech stock market a nonstandard 
place for foreign investors, damaging the credibility of the country. 
An attempt to address the problem of increasing external imbalance using 
monetary tools produced a rapid fall in the rate of growth, as a result of a se- 
vere increase in reserve requirements by the central bank last year; and the de- 
cline in output had serious budget consequences, while the current account 
deficit kept worsening, reaching 8.6 percent of  GDP in 1996. High interest 
rates prompted a resumption of the inflow of speculative capital and pushed the 
exchange rate up to the appreciation limit, thus further hurting current account 
development.  These events, together with the more delicate political balance in 
the wake of the 1996 elections, eroded the confidence of international financial 
markets at a time when the Thai bhat crisis was approaching. 
In the spring of this year, the longtime prevailing exchange rate appreciation 
was reversed, and in mid-May the level was pushed to record lows by  specu- 
lative short selling, despite central bank interventions and dramatic highs in in- 
terest rates. Eventually, the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned and re- 
placed by  a floating rate, and the koruna depreciated by some 12 percent on 
average. The currency shock led to a government reshuffle and an economic 
policy revision, based on drastic fiscal tightening and a public sector wage 
freeze, along with a set of systemic measures such as stock market reform, en- 
ergy and rent control liberalization, and a speeding-up of privatization. 
Five months later the situation has more or less stabilized, despite the devas- 
tating floods that hit parts of the Czech Republic in July. Also growth is esti- 
mated to slow down to about 1.5 to 2 percent. Inflation is still about 10 percent, 
2 percent higher than last year, but the current account deficit will definitely 
end up visibly better this year than in 1996.  The speculation against the koruna 
stopped almost immediately after the currency regime was changed. 
My question is about the substance of these developments. Were they a man- 
ifestation of real economic crisis, or mere turbulence, or only a temporary loss 
of confidence by  international financial markets? Some analysts describe the 
Czech case as an eastern European Mexico. I think this is an exaggerated paral- 
lel. We  could hardly match Mexico’s full-blown economic crisis generated by 
all-around weak fundamentals: Foreign debt, estimated at about 39 percent of 
GDP, remains moderate by the region’s standards, and the debt-servicing ratio 
remains around 10 percent. About 70 percent of liabilities consist of long-term 
debt incurred chiefly by the private sector. Foreign reserves stood at comfort- 
able levels before the crisis, with an import cover of four months. Unlike Mex- 
ico, the Czech Republic is facing its most serious difficulties financing the 
current account deficit, and moreover-and  this is unique-the  fiscal deficit is 
not a problem. 
So when searching for the reasons why the recent shock happened, I think 
we are justified in asking whether the exchange rate fix was not kept too long, 
and whether the degree of currency convertibility adopted in the Czech Repub- 
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was adequate to the depth of changes produced by the transformation process 
in the economy. The enhanced liberalization of capital accounts was not able 
to compensate for the negative effects of the fixed exchange rate regime, which 
disarmed monetary policy. On the contrary, the extensive liberalization of capi- 
tal accounts in circumstances of increased international uncertainty made the 
domestic currency particularly vulnerable to speculative attack. 
One phenomenon illustrates the degree of  convertibility of the Czech cur- 
rency, which exceeds regional standards: The Czech koruna has become the 
only Eurocurrency within the region, and starting in 1995, about fifty-five Eu- 
robond issues were placed in the market. On the one hand, this can be inter- 
preted as a sign of confidence in the Czech economy; on the other hand, I think 
it increases the volatility of the currency and weakens the control of the central 
bank over the money supply. 
The Czech experience shows that a credible exchange rate fix offers impor- 
tant advantages in the earZy  stages of  transition, but in my  opinion, the fix 
should disappear in the medium term. The Czech Republic made this necessary 
shift late, and under pressure from speculation, which increased the cost. The 
introduction of currency convertibility was correct in terms of sequence, but 
too fast in terms of timing. The combination of a fixed exchange rate and exten- 
sive currency convertibility proved to be, in my opinion, a very risky arrange- 
ment at a time when the degree of current account imbalance, and the concern 
of international markets about the sustainability of the situation and the gov- 
ernment’s ability to react, was high. The coincidence of this development with 
the changing view in international markets of some, especially Asian, emerg- 
ing markets provoked speculators to test the Czech currency. The shock was 
strong but short, and after a visible policy shift, the situation has returned to 
normal. The confidence of the international markets has not been substantially 
shaken, which is proved by the exceptionally favorable conditions of credit that 
our central bank was able to mobilize to replenish its international reserves, de- 
pleted during its hopeless attempt to intervene in the market during the attack. 
Judging from these facts, I would call the developments in my country this 
year a terrible short-term crisis, serious turbulence that could be repeated if 
things go wrong. The koruna was attacked not because problems in the Czech 
economy were much worse than in other postcommunist economies. The at- 
tack was, in my opinion, partly a side effect of the strong speculative wave that 
hit other emerging market currencies and was made possible by the degree of 
convertibility of the Czech currency and because preventive exchange rate pol- 
icy action was not taken in time. 
There are arguments that such turbulence has some positive effects. I agree: 
it effectively disciplines economic policy and mercilessly forces changes in 
unsustainable trends. From this perspective, the far-reaching opening of  the 
Czech economy, which allowed this automatic disciplining mechanism to func- 
tion and, through international markets, to punish economic policy mistakes, 
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guments have strong potential, but we should also ask about the costs of this 
volatile adjustment mechanism, and especially whether and when the trans- 
forming economies can afford it. 
The problems the Czech economy faced this year are not unique within the 
region. Trade deficits are becoming a general problem among the transitional 
economies in Europe, and the importance of foreign capital inflows is increas- 
ing. The process of liberalizing and broadening the convertibility of currencies 
is on track and is closely linked to the obligations of  new  central European 
OECD members. It creates a lot of space for the inflow of private capital but 
also makes these relatively weak economies more vulnerable to speculation 
and the risk of capital flight. The scope and speed with which the former com- 
munist countries have opened their economies and adopted currency convert- 
ibility has been much greater than similar processes after World War I1 in west- 
em Europe. Generally, this is regarded as an important sign of progress, and in 
my  opinion, it undoubtedly is. But far-reaching openness also means great 
vulnerability to volatile capital movements and high risk for the still relatively 
weak transforming economies. So I would argue that the degree of convertibil- 
ity and the pace at which it is introduced in these countries should correspond 
to progress in transformation, and the governments and central banks should 
fine-tune the process very carefully, together with a responsible exchange rate 
policy. Otherwise, the price that the small open industrial, ex-communist econ- 
omies will pay for premature capital account liberalization could be quite high. 
The enterprise restructuring question is very important.' Institutional bottle- 
necks still exist within the Czech system: the functioning of the court system, 
bankruptcy procedures, limited protection of  creditors, and things like that, 
which simply prolong the lives of companies that should have gone bankrupt 
a long time ago. Sometimes people exaggerate the role of state ownership of 
the banks. In our case, the state is a very passive owner. The problem within 
the banking sector is not that the state somehow intervenes and pushes banks 
to extend loans but that corporate governance as such is lacking; the state is 
not able to exert its power, either for good or for bad. That is why privatization 
of the banks is one of the priorities of my  government these days, but it is of 
course very controversial. I think there is no secret that our friends from No- 
mura Securities are bidding for the third largest bank in our country, and I wish 
them good luck. The government has already approved it. We  are waiting for 
audits only. It is one component of the package that was adopted after the cur- 
rency crisis, to accomplish systematic reform and to accomplish the privatiza- 
tion of such key institutions as the banks. 
The capital market is another weak point, especially in the Czech Republic. 
It has been the subject of  criticism for many years, and I was one of  those 
pushing for rapid standardization. I think some defects arose naturally because 
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of the voucher scheme. An artificial market was created to enable petty share- 
holders to trade their shares. It was a very nonstandard place and regulation 
was poor, so fraud and illegal practices and insider trading became not the 
exception but the norm. Methods that are unmentionable in developed markets 
have been used quite often, and of  course it has become a political problem. 
The government recognizes it and is making it one of  the priorities for the 
beginning of next year. An independent commission will be established to ex- 
ert control over transactions, and there will be strong reporting requirements, 
as well as legal changes that will divide the mutual funds and banks that came 
into existence during the voucher privatization  and created nontransparent 
structures wherein enterprises have natural links with banks. The banks own 
companies and extend them credit at the same time, and on the other hand, 
the companies own banks. It’s a very nontransparent system, and it has to be 
changed and standardized. 
Discussion Summary 
Nicholas Stern noted that Michael Blumenthal’s observations regarding Russia 
mirror the experiences of the EBRD. Stem said that the pace of change in the 
region has been remarkable but that there are reasons for caution. Previously, 
the EBRD encouraged investors to partner with them in order to convince them 
that “it’s not really as risky as you  think.” Now,  the rationale for partnering 
with the EBRD is that “it’s rather more risky than you think.” In particular, 
Stem drew a distinction between the fundamentals underlying much of  the 
foreign direct investment to the region and the enormous drop in spreads ac- 
companying portfolio flows. Moreover, the region is now characterized by high 
current account deficits and real exchange rate appreciation. The appropriate 
management of  these conditions represents a substantial challenge to poli- 
cymakers in the region. 
Moving from the macroeconomic perspective to the day-to-day realities of 
business, Stem noted that organized crime is pervasive and extremely efficient 
in Russia today. The mafia visits companies immediately after registration and 
carefully monitors them to ensure that steady payments are extracted. None- 
theless, Stern emphasized that private investing in the region, while risky, can 
be extremely lucrative. 
Sebastian Edwards disagreed with the emphasis on portfolio flows in precip- 
itating crises and suggested that the combination of governance and the quality 
of the financial system are determining factors. In fact, if the IMF characteriza- 
tion of the Mexican crisis is correct, he noted, domestic investors took out as 
much money as foreigners did. 
Arminio Fraga commented that banks, and particularly state banks, are cen- 109  Capital Flows to Eastern Europe 
tral to the understanding of these situations. In particular, he noted that while 
private banks are difficult to monitor, public banks are impossible to monitor 
given the interests of bureaucrats and politicians. Consequently, public banks 
should be carefully monitored and supervised or, better yet, closed. 
J%'  Weigl responded that state ownership of  banks is problematic in the 
Czech Republic because of the passive role of the state as an owner and not 
because of excessive intervention. As a consequence, there exists no effective 
governance in state-owned banks. He noted that the privatization of banks re- 
mains central to the future of systemic reform in the Czech Republic. 
Comparing the Czech and Mexican situations, Francisco GiE  Diaz noted that 
the outcome in Mexico may have been more violent as the result of the combi- 
nation of a tenuous reserve position and the overhang created by the issuance 
of the Tesobono bonds. 
Bernard Wusow drew attention to the fact that a number of unviable Czech 
enterprises are still being supported by  the state and that this policy of  sus- 
taining employment in the Czech Republic has not been addressed fully. 
Weigl replied that a number of bottlenecks exist in the restructuring of state- 
owned enterprises. Notably, the legal system and the intransigence of creditors 
are prolonging the lives of companies that are no longer sustainable. He also 
noted that the voucher privatization system has hindered the growth of capital 
markets because it has created an artificial environment in which nonstandard 
behavior is the norm. Therefore, better oversight and standardization of proce- 
dures within capital markets are also important parts of the reform agenda. 
Robert  Feenstra noted that for foreign direct investment to  flow into the 
region, foreign investors must perceive a viable exit opportunity through the 
existence of  robust domestic capital markets. Accordingly, the creation and 
supervision of  such capital markets should be foremost on the agenda for at- 
tracting foreign investment. 
Blumenthal downplayed the importance of  capital markets  for attracting 
greater foreign direct investment. Instead, he noted that the most important 
determinant of future FDI flows would be a legal framework that provides pre- 
dictability and stability. Such a framework is growing in the region, and com- 
panies are responding by investing more. In turn, Blumenthal suggested, capi- 
tal markets will grow to accommodate the needs of the expanding firms. This Page Intentionally Left Blank